London jurisdiction having been agreed by the two owners following a collision in India, liability was admitted and quantum settled by an accepted pre-action ‘Part 36’ offer, appending a more detailed Settlement Agreement. In addition to its London lawyers’ and Club costs (comprised in the ‘Part 36’), the Claimant (in costs proceedings) sought additional fees of Indian agents, lawyers and P&I Correspondents and those of its H&M insurers’ Italian lawyers. The Court found that whilst these items might have been open for recovery under the ‘Part 36’ terms, they were in fact covered by the more detailed Settlement Agreement, which superseded the ‘Part 36’ terms.

Two Monegasque villas and a private jet were sold in breach of a worldwide Freezing Order against Mr Su’s assets. The Claimant thus brought claims for unlawful means conspiracy and violation of rights in the judgment debt (‘Marex tort’) against the Defendant recipients of the sales proceeds, including Mr. Su’s mother and entities in her control. The Court found her to be untruthful, “up to her neck” in conspiracy, and that the Defendants had combined to evade the Order, rendering enforcement more difficult, thus constituting an unlawful means conspiracy. The ‘Marex tort’ was also satisfied as, knowing of the judgment against Mr Su and the Claimant’s rights, the Defendants had procured, induced and/or facilitated transfer of the sales proceeds.

The Claimant Owners brought High Court proceedings against the Defendant Charterers, pursuant to the C/P exclusive jurisdiction clause, for unpaid hire. The Claimants had earlier arrested the POLA DEVORA, at Gibraltar, as security for their claim, in the mistaken belief that she was owned, rather than chartered by, the Defendants, who now sought to counterclaim tortious damages for wrongful arrest. The Court held that as the arrest was in reliance on the Claimants’ C/P rights, it fell within “any dispute arising out of or in connection with” the C/P conferring jurisdiction on the High Court, and allowing it to dismiss the Claimants’ challenge.

After being condemned to pay some USD130m. for wrongful repudiation of a contract under an arbitral award, the Claimant government, STA, obtained from the Court an extension of the 28-day period for challenge. STA issued another challenge under s.68 after the expiry of the extension and on the same day applied for a retrospective extension of time, relying, inter alia, on the replacement of their Attorney General and their legal representatives. The Court dismissed the application on the bases that i) the delay was significant/substantial (27 days from first extension) with no explanation for it, nor evidence the Defendant/Tribunal contributed to it, ii) lack of prejudice to OFY was not a necessity for refusal, iii) the merits were intrinsically weak, and finally iv) refusal was not unfair, a first extension having already been granted.

BP paid some USD17m for crude oil to be delivered FOB in Egypt under contracts with the Defendants (JV partners in the oil field). Deliveries did not take place and BP sought recovery, principally by way of unjust enrichment. In finding in BP’s favour, the Court dismissed various arguments, including that the contracts were merely for rights to lift which, if not taken up, gave rise to no recovery; also time-bar arising out of BP’s GTCs which provided “any claims arising….shall be commenced within 2 years of…date…oil was delivered or, in the case of total loss, should have been delivered”. The Court ruled that there was neither delivery nor total loss so the time bar was inapplicable and in any event, any ambiguity would be resolved in favour of BP.

“The claimant bank, holder of the b/Is, applied under s.12 of the Arbitration Act to extend the 1 year Hague/Hague Visby Rules time for commencing suit (here arbitration) for misdelivery against the disponent owner carrier, KCH. The bank had started proceedings against the registered owner ignoring the bareboat c/p. The Court in its discretion rejected the application as no requirement of s.12 was satisfied: (i) a simple negligent omission (here the bank's solicitors wrongful identification of the carrier — albeit reinforced by KCH's misleading correspondence) could not be outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties; (ii) KCH's conduct did not amount to heavy fault and did not make it unjust to decline to extend as a considerable portion of the causative burden lay with the bank's solicitors who failed to act skilfully.”