Following a collision off Ireland between the laden, 620,000 GRT bulk carrier “Hua Sheng Hai” and the 320 GRT fishing vessel “Kirrixki”, the Irish Court found that “Kirrixki” failed to keep a (or any) look out; she was not (as claimed) lowering nets but slow-steaming to new waters, then suddenly changed course and accelerated just prior to the collision. She was not the stand-on vessel, but in any event was in breach of Colregs for not holding her course and speed, and was the major cause of the collision. “Hua Sheng Hai” whilst not required to change course, nevertheless failed to take timely action to avoid unexpected and sudden danger. Liability was set at 85% “Kirrixki” 15% “Hua Sheng Hai”.

The Borrowers defaulted under a ship finance loan. Two vessels subject to the loan were arrested by other creditors and judicially sold by a port authority. Although joining in the arrests, the Claimant Lenders were initially unaware of the judicial sale of the vessels (for scrap) and received no proceeds. Granting the Lenders’ summary judgment application for the full outstanding loan amounts, the Court ruled that the Lenders were not in breach of their equitable duties: they had merely joined in arrest of the vessels and had done so in good faith; they had never taken possession of them, nor arranged their sale, indeed had no knowledge or control of the sale effected. The Lenders could not be expected to pay off all other creditors in order to move the Vessel elsewhere where better prices might be obtained, nor to seek recovery from the port authority.

The CA dismissed the defendant Owners’ challenge to the Admiralty Court’s ruling that the claimant Salvors were entitled to remuneration pursuant to the Salvage Convention or common law (i.e. limited only by Vessel salved value). Upholding the findings of the Court below, the CA agreed that Owners had failed to discharge their burden of demonstrating, by way of the exchanges with Salvors, an unequivocal intention to enter a binding, fixed remuneration agreement instead. Nor could it be said, in the circumstances, that when urgent negotiations subsided, this evidenced that both parties considered a binding agreement concluded.

The Vessel “Win Win” intending to anchor at EOPL Singapore in February 2019, was within Indonesian territorial waters and was arrested by their Navy (shortly after an anchoring rule change). The Vessel was detained for 18 months and the Master imprisoned. The Defendant war risk insurers contested liability under the Policy, arguing that (i) insured Owners knew/ should have known of the risk, thus the loss was voluntary (ii) the arrest was akin to a customs/ quarantine one and excluded by the Policy (iii) Owners failed in their ‘sue and labour’ duty, including engaging in futile negotiations with Indonesia, thus causing the loss. Each argument failed as did the Defendants’ attempt to avoid the policy for non-disclosure of (unrelated) Greek criminal charges against Owners’ director, held to have had no relevance or bearing on acceptance of the risk.

In relation to issues over whether certain payments had been made, the Claimants sought an order that a collection of some 6,000 of the Defendants’ documents, already manually searched, should now be subjected to “TAR” (technology-assisted review) to ascertain further discloseability. The Judge ruled that, bearing in mind limitations to the TAR system, an order was not justified in relation to documents already subjected to a disclosure exercise, adding that the situation might be different had a new source of documentation been identified.

Disputes arose under a NYPE T/C providing for “BOR [bunkers on redelivery] to be same as actually on board on delivery”. Finding that the required LSFO was unavailable at the redelivery port, Charterers proposed to replenish with LSMGO instead, which Owners declined quoting technical concerns. The Tribunal upheld Owners’ right to damages, Charterers bearing the risk of LSFO unavailability at the final discharge port. Nor did Owners’ duty to mitigate extend to accepting the non-contractual performance tendered. Damages were based on the shortfall amount, at LSFO prices encountered on the next employment, plus the additional cost of LSMGO necessarily consumed in reaching it.