The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal the High Court’s dismissal of an arbitration appeal brought under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The arbitration, conducted under LCIA Rules, involved an agreement between the parties that any appeal to the English courts must be brought “within thirty (30) days after the decision is rendered.” The Claimant had filed the appeal 30 days after receiving the award, but both courts held that time ran from the date the award was made, not communicated, interpreting “rendered” as equivalent to “made” by analogy with the Act, which draws that distinction. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the parties’ agreement on the 30-day period displaced what would otherwise have been a right under the 1996 Act to apply to extend time.

Read the full judgment here.

A London Arbitration Award ruled that NLNG failed to supply Taleveras with LNG cargoes, causing losses on sub-sales.  The ‘dispositive’ section of  the Award required NLNG to indemnify Taleveras for amounts awarded in sub-sales arbitrations. However, in an ‘analysis’ section, the Award directed that the indemnity was subject to endorsement by the sub-sales tribunals. When Taleveras’ sub-sale liability to Vitol was ascertained at some USD233m, NLNG sought a Court declaration of non-liability, based on the absence of endorsement. The CA upheld the High Court’s refusal, ruling that the Award’s ‘dispositive’ section contained a comprehensive statement of the relief being granted to Taleveras.

The Supreme Court held that the time bar in Article III Rule 6 of the Hague and Hague Visby Rules applies to claims for misdelivery after discharge and other breaches occurring post-discharge but before delivery. Rejecting arguments limiting the time bar to the “period of responsibility” (loading to discharge), Lord Hamblen confirmed its broader scope, including pre-loading breaches linked to specific goods. This decision resolves a longstanding legal dispute, clarifying the Rules’ application to breaches beyond the traditional “period of responsibility”.

In a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the BVI Claimant (noted by the Court to be financially challenged) was ordered to provide security for the Defendant’s costs at various stages, 12 days before trial, cleared funds for the last two tranches (totalling almost GBP 1.3m) had still not been paid into Court, nor the trial fee. The High Court allowed a further 6 days for the Claimant to comply, before striking out the claim. The Claimant appealed, citing authority that their uncleared cheque paid into Court within the deadline sufficed. The CA distinguished that case and upheld the High Court ruling of strike out.

In a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the BVI Claimant (noted by the Court to be financially challenged) was ordered to provide security for the Defendant’s costs at various stages, 12 days before trial, cleared funds for the last two tranches (totalling almost GBP 1.3m) had still not been paid into Court, nor the trial fee. The High Court allowed a further 6 days for the Claimant to comply, before striking out the claim. The Claimant appealed, citing authority that their uncleared cheque paid into Court within the deadline sufficed. The CA distinguished that case and upheld the High Court ruling of strike out.

Under MOAs for the sale of tankers, Buyers failed to place 10% deposits in escrow as required; Sellers terminated the MOAs. Buyers contended that Sellers’ claims were restricted to prove damages (rather than the fixed deposits), relying on a long-standing principle that a condition precedent (here lodging deposits), if unfulfilled, is dispensed with in calculating damages. Allowing Sellers’ appeal, the CA ruled that the principle was one of construction not law and was unavailable to a party failing, in breach, to fulfill the condition precedent. Buyers could not benefit from their own wrong by thwarting the accrual of the deposits.