“The Court of Appeal confirmed that the word "unit" in Article IV Rule 5 of the Hague Rules means a physical item and not a unit of measurement. Therefore, the Hague Rules limitation of liability cannot apply to bulk cargoes (in this case a fish oil cargo) and the carrier could not limit its liability to the (uncontested) amount of £100 per ton. Nor was the carrier assisted by a charterparty term conferring on it "the like privileges and rights and immunities" as Article IV. Without more, this only conferred the same rights as the carrier would have had under Article IV and no more.”

“Following an engine room fire in August 2012, it was not until February 2013 that ship-owners sought to abandon their vessel to Underwriters and claim a CTL. The Court of Appeal confirmed the High Court ruling that despite the delay, the owners had not lost the right to abandon or declare a CTL. Widely divergent repair estimates had been in play and it was legitimate to include in the repair figures costs incurred between incident and Notice of Abandonment and SCOPIC remuneration.”

“In interpreting the meaning of the word "act" in clause 8(d) of the ICA (apportionment of liability on a 50-50% basis unless the claim arose out of the act or neglect of one of the parties), the Court of Appeal held that clause 8 is concerned with causation rather than culpability. The critical question is: does the claim "in fact" arise out of the act, operation or state of affairs described? It does not depend upon legal or moral culpability. In the present case, prolonged stay at anchor damaged the cargo and Charterers had to share liability irrespective of whether ordering the vessel to wait at anchor was culpable or not.”

“In this most unusual case, service of a notice of arbitration on a party's agent was deemed valid, the agent having implied and ostensible authority to accept such service, because the principal took "no part, no role and no interest in the negotiation or performance" of the contract.”

“Petrom claimed against Glencore in respect of the latter's sale of 'counterfeit' crude oil cargoes. Glencore had relied on untruthful testimony and had declined to engage in settlement attempts, including a 'Part 36' offer by Petrom, which was significantly bettered by the Court's award. Although the Court awarded enhanced interest, Petrom appealed, seeking the maximum allowable amount, namely 10.5% both on damages and on costs. Despite warning that appeals against the exercise of the judge's discretion are to be rare, the Chancellor agreed, explaining that such interest was not just compensatory but could reflect the Court's disapproval of a party's conduct (here described as 'deplorable if not outrageous') and its encouragement of settlements.”

“The Court of Appeal reversed a High Court order which had struck out a claim for abuse of process. The claimant had made a High Court claim against various defendants in respect of a matter already decided against it in an arbitration it brought against another. The High Court held that it was an abuse of process to advance by 'collateral attack' the same allegations already rejected by the arbitrators. The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the high threshold for abuse of process had not been met: the parties to the Court and arbitration proceedings were different; there were no qualifying 'special circumstances'; no manifest unfairness to the defendants or double vexation of a party and nothing to offend against the spirit of the issue estoppel rule.“