“In the context of the avian flu epidemic of 2015 R, a US supplier of egg products, contracted with N to fulfil, over two years, R's supply commitments. In light of an agreed but suspicious increase in the sale price and alleged failure to meet required US standards, R suspended performance, causing N to claim loss of profit damages. The first instance judge dismissed the quality issue but granted R rescission on the grounds of N's fraudulent misrepresentation as to prices. The CA dismissed N's appeal based on the test of inducement, drawing a distinction between fraudulent and non-fraudulent misrepresentation: the test in the former is less rigorous, as there is no requirement for the representee to show that he would not have entered into the contract but for the representation, it being sufficient that the fraud was "actively present to his mind".”

“The Court upheld the first instance decision that article IV r2(b) exempts the carrier from liability if the fire was caused deliberately or barratrously (meaning without the actual fault or privity of the carrier). The appellants tried in vain to infer that barratry would be incompatible with fault or neglect of the crew (here the chief engineer) but the Court found no basis for justifying such conclusion.”

“Trinity agreed with its agents that shipments for UK importers, Fielding, would be released against documents proving payment for goods. Nevertheless Mr Wolff, Fielding's director, agreed with the agents that shipments would be released just on payment of the agents' fees, the agents then falsifying the documents sent to Trinity. Fielding, in administration, failed to pay for the goods and Trinity (having paid the suppliers) sought damages from Mr Wolff based on various torts including procurement of breach, conversion, deceit and conspiracy. On the evidence, the High Court upheld only the first, the CA agreeing (although granting permission to appeal on conspiracy).”

“The CA has confirmed Teare J's decision to refuse to order a cross-undertaking in damages in relation to a ship-arrest. The CA found that there was no case to intervene on this discretionary decision when the Judge had followed the usual practice; further, departing from the established practice would undermine confidence in the maritime jurisdiction. However, whereas Teare J took the view that only Parliament could bring about the change sought by the defendants, the CA considered that theoretically it fell within the Court's discretion — although in the absence of international consensus and overwhelming support from the maritime industry, there was no reason to alter the status quo.”

“Under a voyage charter on an amended Shellvoy 5 form, charterers exercised their right to cancel but also claimed damages following from a breach of the obligation to commence the approach voyage in time. Although the c/p contained neither ETA nor expected readiness to load provision, the CA, confirming the Court below, found that the c/p references to the previous fixture itinerary equally imposed upon owners an obligation to begin the approach voyage "forthwith" or "within a reasonable time".”

“In March, the Commercial Court ruled that a bank's proceedings against a carrier for misdelivery of cargo activated LOIs granted by voyage charterers, Glencore, to disponent owners, Navig8. Glencore's time bar defence, based on Clause 38 of the voyage charter (providing that "the period of validity of any letter of indemnity will be 3 months from date of issue... the indemnity will expire at the end of.. three-month period"), had been dismissed on the basis that the Clause was not a time bar but simply defined the deliveries to be covered by LOIs. Despite the Court of Appeal holding that Clause 38 did constitute a time bar, it nevertheless dismissed Glencore's appeal on the grounds that the LOI terms were 'stand-alone' and included no equivalent expiry provision to that in the charter. “