“After the collapse of a dam in Brazil, charterers were unable to supply cargoes from a flooded iron ore mine for shipment under a COA and relied on the force majeure or exception clause to excuse their failure. The Court found that in fact charterers would not have shipped cargoes in any event, so there was no causative effect between the dam burst and the failure and the clause was inapplicable. However, owners were unable to recover substantial damages as the dam burst would have prevented the shipment of any iron ore and the compensatory principle operated to prevent owners being placed in a better position than they would otherwise have been.”

“A Tribunal held that a time charter providing "liability for cargo claims... shall be apportioned/settled as specified by the Interclub... Agreement... 1996 and its subsequent amendments..." did not incorporate Clause 9 of the ICA as added in 2011 - providing for the counter-securing of cargo claims — but only those parts of the ICA dealing with settlement and apportionment.”

“The Supreme Court dismissed Playboy Club's appeal in a case about a negligent credit reference for GBP1.6m supplied by BNL for its customer. As was the Club's practice, in order to conceal the gambling purpose, the reference was to be supplied directly to the Club's associated company, Burlington. Relying on the reference, the Club offered a substantial cash facility to its member, who subsequently defaulted. The Club (being the party who had suffered the loss) proceeded against BNL in tort, on the basis of a breach of duty of care. The Supreme Court upheld BNL's defence, ruling that it owed no duty of care to an undisclosed principal who was neither identified nor identifiable.”

“In March, the Commercial Court ruled that a bank's proceedings against a carrier for misdelivery of cargo activated LOIs granted by voyage charterers, Glencore, to disponent owners, Navig8. Glencore's time bar defence, based on Clause 38 of the voyage charter (providing that "the period of validity of any letter of indemnity will be 3 months from date of issue... the indemnity will expire at the end of.. three-month period"), had been dismissed on the basis that the Clause was not a time bar but simply defined the deliveries to be covered by LOIs. Despite the Court of Appeal holding that Clause 38 did constitute a time bar, it nevertheless dismissed Glencore's appeal on the grounds that the LOI terms were 'stand-alone' and included no equivalent expiry provision to that in the charter. “

“By a COA involving several voyages on amended Asbatankvoy terms, Owners' demurrage claims were subject to a 30-day documentary time-bar, running from the day after discharge completed, requiring supporting material to be sent "to Charterers". Owners sent documentation to brokers whose name appeared in a commission clause of the charters. The Tribunal found that those brokers were intermediated brokers whose principals were neither Owners nor Charterers and whose only duty was to pass on messages up and down the chartering chain. Owners could not therefore establish receipt of the documentation by Charterers in time and their claims were time barred.”

“Bumi Armada granted Tozzi a right of first refusal for certain works in a floating gas production and storage facility construction project; having awarded those works elsewhere, Bumi Armada said that the right was not binding as the minutes of meeting recording it (drawn up by Bumi Armada but signed by both parties) were expressed to be "subject to ...contract". The Court of Appeal found that the first refusal agreement had been concluded orally at the meeting and that on the facts, the minutes had no contractual effect and their "subject to contract" proviso was ineffective.”